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With rising health care costs, governments must develop innovative methods to deliver efficient and equitable
health care services. With physician remuneration being the third largest health care expense, the design of
remuneration methods is a priority in health care policy. Otolaryngology-Head and Neck surgeons should have an
understanding of the behavioural incentives associated with different physician payment methods. This article will
outline the different physician payment methods with a focus on discussing the impact on quality of care and
health care costs.
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With rising health care (HC) costs and squeezed finan-
cing, governments must develop innovative methods to
deliver efficient and equitable health care services. How-
ever, delivering efficient health care is inherently complex
and relies on a stochastic process of evaluating disease
probabilities and promoting desired behaviours by health
care providers and patients.
A recent article by Wranik evaluated twenty-one
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries concluding that policies targeting
patient behaviour and physician remuneration were sig-
nificant contributors to the efficiency of health care deliv-
ery [1]. Coupled with the fact that physician remuneration
was the third largest health care expense in Canada in
2007, accounting for 13.4% of overall health care costs,
the design of remuneration methods takes centre stage in
health care policy.
It is commonly accepted that payment methods influ-
ence physician practice behaviour [2]. It is equally clear
that non-financial incentives also play an important role
in shaping behaviours. Insofar as remuneration methods
contribute to behaviour, it is important to design them
in such a way that the incentives they create are aligned
with health care system goals.* Correspondence: Lukerudmik@gmail.com
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unless otherwise stated.This article aims to provide Otolaryngologists with a
basic overview of the theory behind behavioural incentives
associated with different physician payment methods and
highlight the empirical evidence that supports or contra-
dicts theoretical claims. We argue that evidence is not suf-
ficiently strong which has served as the impetus behind the
changes in physician remuneration introduced in Canada.Physician payment overview
The three pure physician payment methods include: fee-
for-service (FFS), capitation, and salary. Since each have
strengths and weaknesses, many jurisdictions have im-
plemented blends of the three systems to combine the
strengths and counteract the weaknesses. In addition,
several jurisdictions have introduced various forms of
pay-for-performance (P4P) systems in an attempt to im-
prove HC quality through payment mechanisms.
When discussing a health care intervention, such as
physician remuneration, defining the term ‘quality’ can be
challenging since it often depends on perspective. A pa-
tient may define quality in terms of wait-list times, equity
of access, continuity of care, or visit satisfaction. From a
physician’s perspective, quality may refer to patient out-
comes (i.e. disease free survival), professional autonomy,
or practice satisfaction. From the health system perspec-
tive, quality may signify appropriateness of services pro-
vided and budget control. For the purposes of this article,
quality will be discussed in terms of patient satisfaction,
appropriateness of care, and continuity of care.is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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Fee-for-service
The fee-for-service (FFS) system rewards the provider
on a “per item of service provided” basis. Physician in-
come is directly related to the number of health care
services performed, creating an incentive to perform a
high quantity of health care activities as financial risks
associated with high volumes of activity sit with the
payer. Since there is motivation to provide high amounts
of services, it is in the physician’s interest to focus on pa-
tient satisfaction and therefore patient retention. The
system also treats each patient equally creating equal in-
centives to accept high cost and/or low cost patients; a
feature violated in a capitation or salary system. A FFS
system is typically coupled with a provider-owned solo
or group practice, which offers flexibility, autonomy and
entrepreneurial opportunity.
A Swedish study by Forsberg et al. demonstrated that
physicians are more aware of patient satisfaction when
receiving FFS remuneration [3]. An American study by
Sorbero et al. demonstrated that patients with stable
chronic diseases were 36% more likely to switch from
capitation-based providers to FFS-based providers. If
switching providers is a measure of satisfaction, then
FFS is associated with higher patient satisfaction for pa-
tients who require more health care services [4].
Devlin and Sarma propose that FFS remuneration tends
to increase health care expenditure, primarily attributed
to a greater quantity of care provided by physicians
and higher administrative costs [5]. An important question
then is whether the increased quantity of care provided is
appropriate. When an appropriate quantity of care is
provided, it can be viewed as ‘productivity’, however, an
inappropriate quantity of care can be considered ‘supplier-
induced demand (SID)’ [6]. Determining whether FFS
increases productivity or SID is challenging. While some
studies suggest that appropriateness of care is not affected
by physician payment method [7,8], several studies have
demonstrated a risk of SID when compensation is tied to
activities provided [9,10]. Overall, FFS likely increases
health care expenditure when evaluating patient visits,
however, most health systems which utilize FFS remuner-
ation control costs with other measures such as wait-lists
or other rationing methods and/or implement user charges
to curb unnecessary demand.
When the goals of a health care system are to increase
patient satisfaction, quantity of care provided, and re-
duce the likelihood of selecting low risk patients (i.e.
cream skimming), then FFS appears to be an excellent
remuneration method. FFS is, however, likely to in-
crease costs due to a greater quantity of services pro-
vided but disentangling whether volume increases are
due to productivity gains or SID deserves further empir-
ical scrutiny.Capitation
Capitation offers a “payment per patient per time period”.
The incentive is to increase the clinical practice’s number
of patients with no direct incentive to increase the quan-
tity of health care activities provided. Therefore, the mo-
tivation is to accept relatively healthy patients, and reject
(cream-skimming) or refer out (dumping) the relatively
less healthy patients, since they will require a higher quan-
tity of HC provided. For the payer, capitation is advanta-
geous as providers face financial risks at the practice level.
A Norwegian study by Iversen and Luras demonstrated
that when remuneration changed from FFS to capitation-
based payment, physicians increased the referral of pa-
tients to private clinics for services that could have been
provided by the referring physician [11]. In 2009, Glazier
et al. compared capitation and FFS practice characteristics
in Canada and demonstrated finding no differences in pa-
tient demographics, however, capitation was associated
with more limited after-hours care, higher patient visits
to the emergency department, and lower patient enrol-
ment compared to the FFS cohort [12]. An American
study by Hibbard et al. demonstrated that physicians
with capitation-based remuneration were more moti-
vated to ensure their patients are less reliant on medical
organizations and promote patient self-care [13]. These
results suggest that capitation-based remuneration may
result in lower care continuity and reduced quantity of
care. To prevent cream skimming, several capitation-
based systems (UK NHS, other examples) utilize risk-
adjusted capitations to compensate for higher risk
patients.
Proponents of capitation argue that it controls costs
by eliminating the incentive for SID and increasing dis-
ease prevention and health promotion [14]. The evi-
dence suggests that capitation reduces quantity of care
provided, and this may ultimately reduce overall health
care expenditure. However, there would only be a cost-
reduction to society if capitation remuneration reduced
SID while still maintaining productivity. Furthermore,
several recent studies suggest there may be no difference
in disease prevention and health promotion between
capitation and FFS [13,15,16]. Results of natural experi-
ments with capitation in comparison to other payment
methods do not solidly support expectations from the-
ory; policy makers cannot claim to implement capitation
systems due to supporting evidence. A risk-adjusted re-
muneration method is critical to maintain access equal-
ity when considering capitation-based payment.
Salary
Salary is a fixed payment “per period of time” remuner-
ation method. Therefore, payment is not dependent on
the number of health care activities nor the number of pa-
tients. This payment method creates a stable, predictable
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incentive to reduce quantity of care. Salaries are an excel-
lent method to recruit and retain physicians to under-
populated or under-supplied regions, whereas FFS or
capitation-based systems would inadequately reward phys-
ician efforts [17]. Salaries often have pre-negotiated ser-
vices and work-hour stipulations built into contracts to
maintain productivity and health care goals.
Proponents of salary-based physician remuneration
state that it improves quality of care by increasing dis-
ease prevention, health promotion, and professional col-
laboration. A Canadian study by Battista and Spitzer
demonstrated that salaried physicians performed more
mammograms, fecal occult blood tests, and Pap-smears
than FFS physicians [14]. A United Kingdom (UK) study
by Gosden et al. evaluated behaviour in salaried primary
care physicians (PCPs) compared to FFS or capitation-
based PCPs. The results demonstrated that salaried
PCPs had smaller patient lists, provided shorter consul-
tations, prescribed less, and spent less time on adminis-
tration. In salaried practices, quality was rated higher in
seven out of thirteen clinical aspects compared to only
two aspects for FFS/capitation practices [18]. However,
two North American studies have demonstrated conflict-
ing evidence, finding no difference in preventative care
practices or self-help promotion between salaried and
FFS physicians [13,16].
Salary payment methods are believed to control costs
by minimizing SID and promoting increased appro-
priateness of care. Furthermore, fixed payments tend to
lower administrative costs to the health care system.
Despite these cost advantages, there is a risk that salary
may come with societal opportunity costs by reducing
productivity and under-providing appropriate care.
Blended remuneration
There is increasing interest in blended physician remuner-
ation, which combines the advantages from each method
while minimizing the potential for negative behavioural
incentives [19]. A recent article by Wranik and Durier-
Copp outlined some commonly utilized blended payment
methods: 1) FFS combined with capitation, which allows
the physician to bill FFS while receiving a small fee for
each patient in the practice, 2) capitation system combined
with a FFS element, where physicians receive a fee to cover
pre-defined services for each patient in the practice, while
services that fall outside can be billed FFS, and 3) salary
system combined with FFS, where physicians receive a
fixed lump fee for practicing and can bill FFS while receiv-
ing a percentage of the billings as further remuneration.
It is still early to determine the full effects of blended
payment methods on general practice. Combining a capi-
tation method with FFS may increase health promotion
and disease prevention, while maintaining productivityand patient access equality. Lower-density or undersup-
plied regions may benefit from a salary method combined
with FFS, which increases physician recruitment and re-
tention, while providing a financial incentive to maintain
productivity. Future research is required to fully elucidate
the effects of blended payment methods on quality and
cost.
Pay-for-Performance (P4P)
With the objective to improve the quality of health care
delivery as well as efficient delivery of care, pay-for-
performance (P4P) both remunerates and measures phys-
ician performance based on achieving certain clinical
targets at the patient population level and quality goals.
Although P4P is appealing in theory, policy makers con-
tinue to face challenges identifying and implementing the
ideal P4P structure that appropriately motivates physicians
[20]. Defining suitable endpoints for payment, which are
likely to be health processes and not outcomes presents an
ongoing implementation challenge. There are also a num-
ber of unintended consequences that can emerge in a P4P
system [21]. Physicians may reduce quality or limit quan-
tity of care in sectors that are not incentivized to focus on
those which are. The fundamental physician-patient rela-
tionship can also change as doctors aim to reach perform-
ance targets and patients’ preferences or clinical priorities
may become collateral damage.
Conflicting evidence on P4P highlights the complexity
of this remuneration method’s design. When evaluating
P4P in a PCP practice setting, a UK study by Doran et al.
demonstrated accelerated quality improvements during
the initial roll-out phases and failed to demonstrate a det-
rimental effect on non-rewarded clinical care sectors [22].
Similarly, another UK study found short-term quality im-
provements for two of three rewarded areas with slowed
improvements once targets were met [23]. When imple-
menting a P4P program in a public health system (e.g.
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand), rewards tend to be
‘bonus’ payments in addition to the regular income of the
physicians, and therefore are bound to increase costs. This
increase in cost must be balanced with the increase in
quality.
Canadian remuneration methods
In order to align behavioural incentives with HC objec-
tives without contributing to excessive increases in HC
costs, there is an interest in developing novel physician
remuneration methods in Canada. In the early years of
implementing alternate payment plans (APPs) for physi-
cians in Canada, several stakeholders thought APPs were
going to replace FFS. However, in a 2011 report pub-
lished by the Canadian Institute for Health Information
(CIHI), the implementation of APPs (such as salary or
capitation) occurred by adding them to an existing FFS
Table 1 Alternate Payment Plans in Canada [25]
Alternate Payment Plan Description % of total APPs in Canada Provinces
Block Funding Used by specialty groups in academic centres 22% Ontario and Nova Scotia
Blended Typically Salary plus FFS 16% Predominantly in Quebec
Capitation Predominantly in PCP practices 16% Concentrated in Ontario
On-Call On-call stipends in addition to FFS 12% Common in most Provinces
Salary Predominantly in rural areas 11% Newfoundland and Labrador and
Northwest Territories
Contract Service contract related payments 11% Concentrated in British Columbia
Sessional Hourly payment for community physicians who
work part time
8% Most Provinces
Northern incentives Working in rural northern communities 4% Concentrated in Ontario and British
Columbia
FFS, Fee for service; PCP, primary care physicians; APP, alternative payment plan.
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by 3.6% suggesting that APPs are primarily being used to
augment behaviours such as prevention and health pro-
motion while keeping FFS to maintain volume of care
[24,25]. Table 1 outlines the different APPs currently im-
plemented in Canada.
The challenge is that the implementation of APPs in
Canada has typically been introduced to augment special-
ties with lower-than-average FFS incomes or remunerate
physicians in low population regions. This has effectively
increased the cost of physician remuneration when shifting
from a pure FFS method. For example, in British Columbia
the cost of changing from FFS to APP service contracts in
the emergency department resulted in a cost increase of
$12.8 million for service contacts [26]. Another example
are the Physicians in the Academic Health Services
Sciences Centres program who received an additional
$225 million in funding in addition to FFS payments [27].
Lastly, implementation of a Capitation-based APP in the
Ontario Primary Health Care program would provide a
capitation income of $328,000 per physician in compari-
son to the average gross income of the same practice size
of $226,200 in FFS payments [28]. Therefore, current APP
implementation appears to increase overall HC cost, how-
ever, it is important that the cost input be put into context
of the quality of physician output. Policy makers and phy-
sicians need to consider the behavioural incentives associ-
ated with each payment method rather than focusing
purely on the cost. Future studies are needed to evaluate
the impact of APPs and P4P on the quality of care pro-
vided to patient using several different output metrics.
Conclusion
The theory behind physician remuneration methods has
been highlighted in many studies. We understand that in
principle, FFS motivates quantity of care, while capitation
motivates acceptance of healthier patients. Salaries offerstable incomes and allow physicians to focus their practice
on patient needs, rather than on billable services. In theory,
the blending of payment methods can combine the advan-
tages of the pure methods. Where blending of methods is
not sufficient, bonus pay-for-performance programs may
be able to motivate the provision of targeted services.
Policy makers need to consider not only the expected be-
havioural incentives associated with payment methods but
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